Abstract. Deficits of problem-solving ability in focal brain-damaged patients, with special reference to frontal lobe dysfunction, were investigated by two neuropsychological tests: Temporal rule induction test and Hypothesis-testing measure. Subjects consisted of 84 chronic brain-damaged patients (31 with anterior cerebral lesions and 53 with posterior lesions). The study's aim was to investigate the effects of frontal lobe damage on two aspects of inductive reasoning, prediction and hypothesis behavior. When prediction was examined by Temporal rule induction test, patients with anterior lesions showed deficits in predicting a rule, even in the memory-aid condition in which memory factors were excluded. The poor results on Temporal rule induction test in frontal patients did not appear to be related to deficits in temporal integration, which is generally interpreted as frontal dysfunction. Rule induction may be impaired by frontal damage whenever complicated information-processing is required, even when temporal succession is not involved. Second, two stages of hypothesis behavior, hypothesis-formation and hypothesis-testing, were evaluated. Patients with anterior lesions showed impairment in hypothesis-formation. Their decreased fluency in hypothesis production affected the hypothesis-testing process. However, frontal patients committed fewer errors, most of which were perseverative (lose-stay errors) on hypothesis-testing. Patients with posterior lesions revealed other characteristic errors, such as inconsistent responses and divergent type errors (improper lose-shift errors). The hemispheric site of the lesion affected only the ability to maintain a hypothesis (win-shift errors). The results illustrated the differences in problem-solving deficits in these two groups of patients. Disturbed prediction of future events, decreased hypothesis fluency, and abnormal lose-stay behavior in patients with frontal lobe damage may be crucial factors in coping with daily problem-solving situations. (Keio J Med 41 (2): 87-98, June 1992) 
Introduction
In terms of the psychological processes of "thinking", patients with focal brain damage are believed to show various problem-solving or reasoning deficits that corre spond to the lesion sites. Reports in the behavioral neuro sciences have described these deficits,1,2 leading to the inclusion of problem-solving tasks in mental status exam inations of brain-damaged patients at many institutions. The Wisconsin Card Sorting Test3 and the Tower of London Test are typical problem-solving tasks. Because problem-solving ability involves a complex combination of simpler skills, such as memory and perception, it is not easy to classify or define. The term "problem-solving" may be used in different ways by different investigators in relation to concepts such as abstraction and plan ning. For instance, Weintraub and Mesulam5 classified problem-solving tasks into the areas of "reasoning and abstraction" and "planning and sequencing" , whereas Cronin-Golomb6 divided abstract reasoning into "con cept formation", "concept shift", and "problem solving" . The present study evaluated the ability of subjects to Reprint requests to: Dr Masaru Mimura, Department of Neuropsychiatry. School of Medicine , Keio University, 35 Shinanomachi, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 160, Japan 87 perform two tests that required inductive reasoning in the problem-solving process. Inductive reasoning represents a psychological pattern in which a rule is generalized from individual events. Since this way of problem-solving is common in tasks of daily life, deficits in inductive reasoning may affect various routine activi ties and therefore may affect the rehabilitation of brain damaged patients. Neuropsychological tasks designed to examine prediction and hypothesis-testing ability require inductive reasoning. In general, a problem-solving ability is believed to be related to frontal lobe function, and in particular, to the planning,7,8 supervisory attention system,4 and goal-oriented behavior.9 Some studies have shown that the ability to predict events and to sample hypotheses are particularly impaired by frontal lobe damage.10,11 The main purpose of this study was to investigate the effects of frontal lobe damage on predic tion and hypothesis behavior. Experiment 1, the temporal rule induction test, which was based on the method of Ajuriaguerra et al12 with modifications, investigated prediction deficits in patients with brain damage. Prediction of future events in time sequence has been assessed in terms of temporal in tegration of behavior, which is generally interpreted as a frontal function. 13 Messerli et al14 found that patients with frontal lobe damage tended to fail in the same tasks as those tested by Ajuriaguerra. The investigators defined this deficit as a disorder of temporal integration. Because temporal integration is based on memory function, the author designed new tasks that eliminated memory factors in order to evaluate the pure reasoning process of prediction and the relation between prediction and temporal integration.
When individuals face complicated, multiple stimuli, they try to form plural hypotheses and then focus them down to a plausible one. This process is called the 'hypothesis theory' . Experiment 2, the hypothesis-testing measure used the method of Levine15 
Subjects
Eighty-four patients with focal brain damage were studied (Table 1 ). Lesions were localized by computed tomography (CT) scan. Data provided by CT scanning were evaluated according to the methods of Kato, 16 Tanabe et al17 and Matsui et alts All patients had unila teral lesions confined to the anterior (pre-Rolandic) or posterior (retro-Rolandic, including the temporal lobe) part of the brain. The subjects were inpatients or out patients of the Keio University Hospital, Yokohama Municipal Yuai Hospital, Saiseikai Kanagawa Hospital or Edogawa Hospital between March 1989 and October 1991. All patients were right-handed and had been chronically brain damaged for at least 3 months. Excluded from study were patients with multiple lesions, patients with lesions extending to both anterior and posterior areas, and patients without cortical damage (eg, thalamic hemorrhage, small infarction localized in the subcortical white matter). Patients who were unable to perform the tasks because of severe aphasia, apraxia, agnosia, or an uncooperative attitude were also excluded. Mild aphasia was observed in 3 of 14 patients with left anterior lesions and in 14 of 21 with left posterior lesions, but none of these aphasic patients were unable to understand the tasks or to respond verbally. Cerebrovascular disease Demographic data ANOVA yielded no significant differences in age and educational level among patients. There were no signi ficant differences in sex distribution [chi square=0 .006 (A/P), 0.02 (L/R)].
Neuroradiological evaluation
The total amount of damage and the coefficient of visual cerebral atrophy were calculated from CT findings. The total amount of damage was obtained by adding the 
Neuropsychological evaluation
The Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) was administered to measure intelligence, the digit span forward to measure attention, and the 7-word learning test and circle-cross pattern learning test to measure memory. In the 7-word learning test, 7 words [fune (ship), yama (mountain), inu (dog), kawa (river), mori (forest), yoru (night), and jitensha (bicycle)] were pre sented verbally to test the subject's immediate recall. The score was based on the maximum number of words recalled during five successive trials. In the circle-cross pattern learning test, three to six combinations of circles and crosses were presented visually, and the subject was asked to draw them 30 seconds later. Thus , this visual learning test involved simple sequences . Neither (Fig 1) Colored cards were used instead of lamps for the test devised by Ajuriaguerra et al12 and Steeb et al19 After repetition of a constant sequence, the subject was expected to predict the next event in the sequence. Stimulus presentation was performed in two trials: in the first trial, the stimulus was temporary, as in con ventional tests (cards were placed face up on the table, and then immediately turned face down); in the second trial, the memory-aid condition, the stimulus was con tinuous (cards were placed face up and left face up on the table). The tasks were also modified by combining the relatively easy tasks of Ajuriaguerra et al with the difficult task of Talland (sequential concept formation test). 20 The test modifications have been described previously.21 
Experiment 1-2: Second trial
If a subject failed a task on the first trial, the examiner repeated the task, this time placing the cards (stimuli) face up on the table in the order of presentation to ex clude memory and temporal factors (Fig 1, Second trial) .
Evaluation of the results of Experiment 1
Results were evaluated in terms of the following factors: (1) Number of tasks achieved; the number of tasks from (A) through (E) in the first and second trials that the subject correctly predicted. (2) Number of se quences required for task achievement; the number of sequences presented before the subject was able to correctly predict in tasks (C) and (E). If no correct prediction was obtained by the 10th sequence, the se quence number was designated as 11. For example, if the subject were responding to color "red" , the order would be left
right(R). If the subject were responding to number "two" , the order would be L-R-R-L, allowing the examiner to recognize which hypothesis the subject was holding. Then, stimulus card (II) was placed beneath stimulus card (I), and the subject was asked to select figures on the response cards that corresponded to both stimulus cards (I) and (II). The examiner's selection criterion remained unchanged during a single task, but that the subject could retain or shift the previous hypo thesis. Subsequently, stimulus cards (III) and (IV) were similarly presented. As Fig 2 shows , when only stimulus card (I) is presented, there are four possible hypotheses: "green" , "triangle", "two", and "right side". After the second stimulus card is added, the hypotheses are narrowed down to "green" and "triangle", and thus the hypotheses of number and position are abandoned. When the third stimulus card is presented, the hypo thesis is narrowed down to only one, "green", which is verified when the fourth card is presented. In Fig 2, the examiner selected the criterion of color (green). The actual tasks were carried out for three selection criteria: form (triangle), number (two), and position (left). Each task required 4 responses, for a total of 12 responses.
Evaluation of the results on Experiment 2
General aspects of performance were evaluated as follows: In Experiment 2-1: Hypothesis-formation task, hypothesis fluency was judged by the number of hy potheses mentioned by the subject within one minute. In Experiment 2-2: Hypothesis-testing tasks , three indices, hypotheses used, hypotheses achieved and total number of errors were calculated. Hypotheses used was based on the number of categories used by the subject in the process of hypothesis-testing. Hypotheses achieved was the number of tasks that ended in a correct criterion after presentation of four stimulus cards . The total number of errors was calculated for three tasks, with 12 responses in total.
In Experiment 2-2, errors were analyzed according to two patterns; inconsistent response and disturbance of focusing. In the first pattern, the subject was unable to express a consistent hypothesis while pointing to figures on the four response cards. If a subject chooses logically based on any of the four hypotheses , he/she always makes two responses on the right and two on the left or all four responses on one side, whereas a subject with an inconsistent response makes three responses on one side and one on the other, as shown in Fig 3 ( R L-L-L). This pattern of error was considered to indicate that the subject responded without a hypothesis, or that he/she was unable to express the hypothesis adequately.
When there was disturbance of focusing, the subject responded correctly to the stimulus card presented last, but he/she could not narrow down the hypotheses systematically throughout the presentation of all stimulus cards [eg, (I) and (II) in Fig 4] . This pattern was further divided into three types with different characteristics; lose-stay error, win-shift error, and improper lose-shift error. Lose-stay error is an error type in which the subject cannot change the former hypothesis to fit a new stimulus [Fig 4, left upper] . In contrast, win-shift error is an error in which the subject cannot maintain the former hypothesis, even though it is supported by the Table 3 shows the number of tasks achieved and the number of sequences required to achieve Tasks (C) and (E) in the first and second trials. In the first trial, in which cards were turned down immediately after the color on the card was shown, patients in Group A (anterior) achieved significantly fewer tasks than patients in Group P (posterior). This tendency was also observed in the second trial, in which cards were placed face up in a row. In the first trial of Task (E), the most difficult task, 3 of 31 patients in Group A and 13 of 53 in Group P correctly predicted the sequence. The difference between groups was not statistically significant (chi square=1.92, p>0.05), but in the second trial, significantly fewer patients in Group A (15 of 31) correctly predicted the sequence compared with Group P (43 of 53) (chi square= 8.34, p<0.01). In the first trial, there were no differences between Groups A and P in the number of sequences required to achieve Tasks (C) and (E), but in the second trial, significantly more sequences were required in Group A than in Group P.
Results from the first trial and the basic neuropsy chological tests for Groups A and P were correlated to determine factors responsible for the poor results in Group A in the first trial (Table 4) . Particularly in the first trial of Task (E), elementary functions of memory and attention may have affected the results because the stimuli were turned down immediately after being pre sented. In Group P, results of the first trial (the number of tasks achieved and the number of sequences required for Task (E)) showed high correlations with 7-word The results arc group means (standard deviation in brackets) and F-value of ANOVA. *: p<0 .05, **: p<0.01 (Table 5) : Group A also tended to use fewer hypotheses. In contrast, Group P tended to have a poorer result than Group A in achieving (correctly verifying) hypotheses at the final step. The total number of errors in the process of hy pothesis-testing was also significantly higher in Group P. These results suggest that the number of errors com mitted by Group A in the process of hypothesis-testing was relatively small despite the restricted production and use of hypotheses, while Group P demonstrated poor hypothesis-testing, although the fluency and use of hy potheses were preserved.
The correlation coefficient showing the relation between hypothesis fluency and hypotheses achieved in Group A was r=0.49 (p<0.01),
indicating that restricted production of hypotheses may affect the hy pothesis-testing process. In Group P, the correlation coefficient was relatively low (r=0.25, p>0.05), in dicating that production of hypotheses did not directly affect the hypothesis-testing process. The results in Group P suggested the existence of some qualitative problem in the hypothesis-testing process other than hypothesis-formation.
The quality of responses was evaluated by analyzing error patterns to investigate this possibility.
Analysis of error patterns: Table 6 shows the number of errors committed according to pattern. The frequency of inconsistent response (three responses on one side and one response on the other side) was significantly higher in Group P compared with Group A. In contrast, the mean number of lose-stay error in Group A was 3.0, compared with 2.3 in Group P, suggesting that errors in Group A may have been caused by an inability to switch from one hypothesis to another. Because the number of The results are group means (standard deviation in brackets) and F-value of ANOVA. *: p<0 .05, **: p<0.01 
Discussion
The temporal rule induction test included inductive reasoning tasks in which a rule is predicted on the basis of sequential events. The involvement of memory skills may vary with the degree of difficulty of the task. In a highly difficult task like (E) in the first trial, memory played an important role. When Talland20 tested patients with Korsakoff syndrome with a task corresponding to (E) using playing cards, he concluded that the principal cause of the patients' poor results was a deficit of short term memory. Lhermitte et al24 compared the per formance of patients with alcoholic Korsakoff syndrome with that of patients with the post-encephalitic amnesic syndrome using cards of three different colors. They found that the patients with alcoholic Korsakoff syndrome showed particularly poor performance in sequential learning activities because of deficits in information processing (recall) of complicated mnesic activities. 25 Ajuriaguerra et al12 and Steeb et al,19 using lamps of two colors, evaluated relatively easy tasks corresponding to tasks (A) (B) and (C) in the first trial of this study. They separated the prediction of future events from memory and defined prediction as the ability to induce a rule and found that this ability is decreased in senile dementia and the Korsakoff syndrome. 26 The ability to predict a temporal sequence is believed to be related to the frontal lobe based on the temporal integration of behavior, which Fuster13 described as a prefrontal function. Messerli et al14 performed a test using lamps of two colors to 32 patients with frontal lobe damage and found that the results for Task (C) were poor. The investigators attributed the cause of the poor results in patients with frontal lobe damage to impaired temporal integration of behavior and impaired pro gramming of asymmetrical sequence pattern. Villa et al10 evaluated the tasks tested by Messerli et al14 using cards similar to those used in the present study and they also found that patients with frontal lobe damage showed poor results on Task (C). Villa et al also considered the poor results to be related to an impaired temporal integration of behavior.
Unlike Messerli et al14 and Villa et al,10 the current study showed that Task (C) was relatively easy for patients in general, and that anterior/posterior locus did not affect results. There were also no differences between groups for Task (E), probably because the task was too difficult. Only 3 (9.7%) of 31 patients with anterior lesions and 13 (24.5%) of 53 patients with posterior lesions achieved Task (E) correctly in the first trial. However, when results were analyzed by the number of tasks achieved, there were significant differences between patients with anterior and those with posterior lesions because of the poor performance of patients with anterior lesions on Tasks (D) and (E). Although elementary functions, such as memory and attention are important in Task (E), there were no direct correlations between memory or attention and performance of Task (E) in patients with anterior lesions. So, the poor results on Task (E) in patients with anterior lesions cannot be explained by these factors.
The poor results in patients with anterior lesions were more outstanding in the second trial than in the first. In the second trial, the number of tasks achieved was significantly fewer and the number of sequences required to achieve tasks (C) and (E) was significantly greater in patients with anterior lesions. Also, more than half (16 of 31) of the patients with anterior lesions were unable to perform Task (E); in contrast, over 80% (43 of 53) patients with posterior lesions were able to achieve Task (E). In the second trial, in the memory-aid condi tion, patients were allowed to refer to former events (the cards presents previously) as they wished. In the present study, however, patients with anterior lesions showed poor performance even on the second trial. Thus, the poor results in patients with anterior lesions were again difficult to attribute to deficits of temporal integration or complicated mnestic activities, which are generally thought to exist in patients with frontal lobe damage. Whenever complicated information-processing is required, induction of a rule and prediction of future events may be impaired by frontal lobe damage, even under a simultaneous processing condition without temporal succession.
According to Levine's theory on hypothesis behavior, if individuals obtain results that support their hypothesis (right, positive feedback), they continue to hold that hypothesis (win-stay), and if they obtain results contra dictory to their hypothesis (wrong, negative feedback) , they abandon it (lose-shift). 15 Numerous reports indicate that this hypothesis behavior is disturbed in patients with various kinds of organic brain damage. For instance , Oscar-Berman27 used a modified method of Eimas et al12 in patients with Korsakoff syndrome, and found that hypothesis behavior was disturbed even if memory factors were excluded by providing memory aids. She found that Korsakoff patients tended to use fewer hypotheses and that the normal win-stay and lose-shift behaviors in their problem-solving processes were dis turbed. Deficits of hypothesis behavior in patients with Huntington's chorea,28 elderly patients with alcoholism29 and patients with multiple sclerosis30 have also been shown in studies which used similar tasks.
In the present studd, the psychological control in herent in hypothesis behavior was studied in two stages: hypothesis-formation and hypothesis-testing. The results first suggested that patients with anterior lesions were impaired in the hypothesis-formation stage. The fluency of producing hypotheses was significantly decreased in patients with anterior lesions. The results also suggested that there were qualitative differences in errors in the hypothesis-testing stage between the patients with anterior lesions and those with posterior lesions. Namely, in patients with anterior lesions, the decrease in hypothesis production (fluency) affected reasoning in hypothesis testing, and perseverative errors (lose-stay errors) pre dominated in total errors. In patients with posterior lesions, in contrast, production (fluency) and use of hypotheses were preserved, but those patients showed more qualitative deterioration, such as inconsistent responses. Patients with posterior lesions thus tended to have difficulty in responding logically or consistently. Also, patients with posterior lesions were likely to show improper lose-shift errors, in which an incorrect hy pothesis is divergently changed to another incorrect one. The hemispheric site of the lesion had no effect on production, use and achievement of hypotheses or error patterns, but the incidence of win-shift errors (difficulty of maintaining hypothesis) was significantly higher in patients with right hemispheric damage than in those with left hemispheric damage.
When Cicerone et al11 studied the effects of frontal damage on hypothesis behavior, they found no differ ences in normal win-stay behavior between patients with anterior and posterior lesions, whereas lose-stay errors were more common among patients with frontal lobe lesions. These investigators concluded that the tendency of patients with frontal lobe lesions to continue to hold an incorrect hypothesis was caused by impaired abstraction, flexibility, or processing of feedback related to the frontal lobe deficit because this tendency was similar to per severative errors on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test. These findings correspond to the increased ratio of lose-stay errors (perseverative errors) in patients with anterior lesions in the present study.
The present study showed an increase in win-shift errors (difficulty of maintaining hypothesis) in right brain-damaged patients. In contrast, when Rausch31 studied patients with unilateral temporal lobe excision, he found that patients with left temproal lobe excision tended to exhibit win-shift errors, changing the correct hypothesis to an incorrect one, whereas patients with right temporal lobe excision tended to retain a certain hypothesis even if it turned out to be wrong (lose-stay errors). Rausch pointed out the similarity between the performance of patients with right temporal lobe excision and that of Korsakoff patients, and suggested that a hippocampal dysfunction other than a memory disturbance was responsible for the behavior. However, our previously published results with the new modified Wisconsin Card Sorting Test16,32 indicated that win-shift errors (difficulty of maintaining set) rather than lose-stay errors (perseverative errors) were more characteristic of right brain damage than of left brain damage.33
Conclusions
Two problem-solving tests that require inductive reasoning were administered to patients with focal brain damage. The study's aim was to investigate the effects of frontal lobe damage on two aspects of inductive reasoning; prodiction and hypothesis behavior. 1) In Experiment 1: Temporal rule induction test, patients with anterior lesions showed deficits in predicting a rule not only in the first trial (the stimulus was temporary) but also in the second (the stimulus was continuous), in which memory factors were excluded. In patients with anterior lesions, there were no direct correlations between memory or attention and task performances. The poor results on Experiment 1 of patients with anterior lesions did not appear to be related to deficits in temporal integration, which is generally interpreted as a frontal dysfunction. Inducing a rule and predicting future events may be impaired by frontal lobe damage whenever complicated information processing is required, even under a simul taneous condition without temporal succession. 2) In Experiment 2: Hypothesis-testing measure, hypothesis behavior was divided into a hypothesis-formation stage and a hypothesis-testing stage. Patients with anterior lesions showed severe impairment in the hypothesis formation stage. Their hypothesis fluency was reduced, and this decreased hypothesis production affected their reasoning in hypothesis-testing. 3) There were differ ences in the pattern of errors in the hypothesis-testing stage between the patient groups. Patients with anterior lesions committed fewer errors than those with posterior lesions, and lose-stay error (perseverative error) pre dominated in total errors. Patients with posterior lesions revealed qualitative deterioration in behavior , such as inconsistent responses. Improper lose-shift error (divergent error), in which an incorrect hypothesis was changed to another incorrect one, was also characteristic of patients with posterior damage . The hemispheric site of the lesion had no effect, except on win-shift error (difficulty of maintaining hypothesis). 4) The results of these two problem-solving tests revealed differences in deficits in patients with focal brain damage. Disturbed prediction of future events, decreased fluency of hy pothesis and abnormal lose-stay behavior may be crucial factors in the ability of patients with frontal lobe damage to cope with daily problem-solving situations. 
